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ABSTRACT
The concept of a variable mission ship, specifically
designed for rapid conversion from one specialized mission
to another is developed. First, the need for an expanded
U.S. flag merchant marine is established. The variable
mission concept is then presented as an incentive to at-
tract additional private and government funds to the liner
industry. This concept is noted to have commercial/com-
mercial and commercial/military significance. The commer-
cial/military mode is selected for emphasis in the thesis
and the applicability of this mode to military missions is
then developed. As an example, a variable mission cata-
maran is developed which, through conversion, can operate
in either a roll-on/roll-off mode or a container ship mode.
THESIS SUPERVISOR: P. I'andel
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The situation in which the confirming physical observ-
ation follows the complete development of the concept is ex-
tremely rare. Generally the concept results from the attempts
of the hangers-on to explain the observations of the genius.
This thesis is no exception*
The initial observation was that multipurpose ships do
several things adequately, none optimally; and that the mod-
ern shipbuilding industry can accomplish large changes in a
ship's configuration in relatively short periods of time.
This initial observation was made by Professor S.C. Reed,
Associate Professor of Naval Engineering at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. A second observation was the recog-
nition of the similar roles in minesweeping and in fishing
that might be played by a single vessel. The result was the
minesweeper/fishing vessel design of H.A. Chatterton.*
The present thesis begins the development of a concept
which suggests that Chatterton's IIS/FV is not an isolated
incident, but rather is a first example whose lessons are
widely applicable. This concept envisions a ship that is
truly variable in mission, as opposed to the more commonly
seen multi-purpose ship. A variable mission ship is perceiv-
ed to be one which undergoes a complete metamorphosis in its
change of mission. Before change it is a specialized ship
performing a specialized mission. After change it is a
- 6 -

specialized ship performing a different specialized mission.
Part I develops the variable mission concept from both
the maritime commercial and military points of view. In Part
II a pair of example missions are chosen and a specific ship
design and its performance of these missions is analyzed.
It should be noted that the concept of the variable mis-
sion or metamorphic ship as it is developed in this thesis
tends to emphasize the commercial/military mission package
as opposed to the commercial/commercial case. This emphasis
results from (1) the fact that the author f s experience has
been largely in the military field and, (2) the author T s in-
ability to obtain, in the time available, sufficient data
to develop two profitable missions within the commercial
sphere. There is nothing about the concept, however, that
limits it to a commercial/military design. It is fully as
applicable to a changing commercial market as it is to a
war or other international crisis.
:Chatterton, Howard A. An Analysis and (ptii'dzation of a
Combination 'inesweeper/.Fishing Vessel . Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Department of Naval Architecture




THE VARIABLE MISSION CONCEPT
Previously, however, to the solicitation, I en-
deavored to prepare the minds of the people by writ-
ing on the subject in the newspapers, which was ray





THE VARIABLE MISSION CONCEPT
1-1 MERCHANT MARINE
1-1-1 Need for Modernization
The basic missions of the U.S. flag merchant marine were
stated in 1936 under Title I, Section 101 of the Merchant Mar-
ine Act.
It is necessary for the national defense and devel-
opment of its foreign and domestic commerce that the Un-
ited States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient
to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and a substan-
tial portion of the water-borne export and import for-
eign commerce of the United States and to provide ship-
ping service on all routes essential for maintaining the
flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce
at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and mil-
itary auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c)
owned and operated under the United States flag by cit-
izens of the United States insofar as may be practicable,
and (d) composed of the best equipped, safest, and most
suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United
States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen
personnel. It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the United States to foster the development and^encour-
age the maintenance of such a merchant marine. 1*
In addition to the legislated missions mentioned, two other
functions of the U.S. flag fleet are prominent. First, the
federal government has regarded the reserve fleet as a mech-
anism by which freight rates in the shipping markets may be
stabilized in times of heavy demand for services. Both World
War I and World War II saw the development of incredibly high
freight rates prior to U.S. entry into the war. These rate in-
creases were due principally to the fact that this country had
^References appear at the end of each Part,
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depended upon foreign vessels for its international trade dur-
ing peacetime and, with the advent of war, found it difficult
to charter foreign vessels in sufficient quantities, 2
Since World War II the United States government has had at
its disposal a large reserve fleet with which it can alter the
balance of supply and demand in the shipping markets virtually
at will. Thus, during the Korean (1950-1953) and Suez (1956)
crises relatively stable rates were maintained in the shipping
markets by reactivation of reserve fleet vessels.-^
A second and more recently developed function of the U.S.
flag fleet is to act as a positive factor in a rapidly deter-
iorating U.S. balance of trade. During the three years 1964-
1966 for example, the U.S. balance of payments (as measured on
the liquidity basis) ran a total deficit of $5.5 billion.^"
During these same years the U.S. flag fleet provided a positive
contribution of $2.2 billion. -> That is, had the services pro-
vided by the U.S. flag fleet been performed instead by foreign
owned and operated vessels, the balance of payments deficit
for these years would have been #7.7 billion. This is a size-
able impact and it takes on added significance in these days
of slim foreign trade balances and domestic inflation.
It is apparent that there are four major functions or
missions of the U.S. merchant marine.
1. - Carry, under U.S. flag and in modern ships,
a substantial portion of U.S. foreign trade.
2. - Maintain freight rate stability.
- 10 -

3. - i ake a positive and significant contribution
to the U.S. balance of payments.
4. - Serve as a military auxiliary in time of
national emergency.
Is the U.S. merchant marine of today performing these
missions? Table I shows the percentages of total U.S. ocean-
borne export and import tonnage carried by U.S. flag vessels
as a group and by U.S. liners in particular (as a percentage
of total liner tonnage*), with the remainders being carried
under foreign flag.
It is apparent that, as a group, U.S. flag vessels are
not carrying anything like a substantial portion of the coun-
try^ foreign trade tonnage. The 8.0-9.0/* of years 1962-63
compares unfavorably with the same figures for other trading
nations in 1962-63. 6
Percentage of tonnage







U.S. liners, though, have been able to compete more ef-
fectively with foreign liner services and have maintained 20-
*For a definition of the distinction between liner and other
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ICxcept as noted below, all figures are taken or adapted
from Changing Patterns in U.S. Trade and Shipping Capac-
ity
.
U.S. Department of Commerce, December 1964.
* 1967 Annual Report of the maritime Administration
.
U.S. Department of Commerce \ November 1967.
** "Inadequacy of Maritime Trade Cited." The Journal of
Commerce
. January 11, 1963, p. 25.
Note: The large drop in the U.S. flag liner percentages in
1965 and 1966 is attributed by the I-aritime Administ-
ration to the heavy Vietnam sealift requirements that




30/o of the liner market in recent years. This success is due
in large part to the receipt of operating differential subsid-
ies by many of the firms providing liner services. The rela-
tive success of the liners takes on added significance in view
of the fact that, even though total liner tonnage has recently
been 15-20,4 of total U.S. oceanborne tonnage, the dollar value
of liner cargo represents about SOfo of the dollar value of all
cargo, ' Thus the liner industry attracts most of the higher
value cargoes.
The figures above describe past performance of the mer-
chant marine. Future world trade projections paint an even
gloomier picture. While U.S. trade has been growing steadily
in total tonnage and value, total world trade has increased
much mure rapidly. U.S. flag shipping has not only been los-
ing its fractional share of U.S. trade, but it has not taken
part in the growth in world trade. U.S. trade is expected to
triple within thirty years. Total world trade will more than
quadruple in that time. U.S. flag shipping has had a diffi-
cult time trying to hold a constant share of a slowly growing
market. It will be immeasurably more difficult in the future
to capture a larger share of a rapidly growing market.
In spite of the relative success of the U.S. flag liner
industry, and without considering either numbers of ships or
the effects of cargo preference laws and subsidy programs, it
can be concluded that today f s U.S. flag merchant marine is not
carrying a substantial portion of U.S. oceanborne foreign trade.
- 13 -

Further, it will not do so in the future. Thus the merchant
marine is not performing adequately as regards its first maj-
or function.
During the Korean (1950) and Suez (1956) crises the U.S.
government had a reserve fleet whose average age was between
seven and fifteen years. The ships were in relatively good
shape, reasonably modern, numbered about two thousand", and
comprised 14-13% of total world deadweight tonnage. They
were effective transport veliicles. Today these ships are more




and comprise 3»6$ of world deadweight tonnage. It is
doubtful that they could be reactivated and modernized so as to
have an appreciable effect on market conditions during an inter-
national crisis. It should be noted that some of these ships
have been put to use during the relatively limited Vietnam con-
flict. During the period July 1965 to April 1967 a total of
161 ships v/ere reactivated at a shipyard activation cost of
about ^450,000 each (cost does not include outfitting, towing,
husbanding, etc.). •* Nevertheless, in event of major disrup-
tion of the shipping markets, it does not seem likely that the
U.S. reserve fleet could achieve the dominance necessary to
stabilize freight rates.
In regard to the balance of payments function the effect
of the U.S. merchant marine is twofold. First, the U.S. flag
fleet serves to prevent the loss of revenues to foreign ship-
ping. As noted above, it saved ;2.2 billion during 1964-1966.
- 14 -

Second, the U.S. merchant marine as a whole earns a consider-
able amount of foreign revenue. In 1965 foreign revenue earned
amounted to ,;6#0 million, making shipping services the seventh
largest export item (after machinery, transportation equipment,
metals and manufactures, wheat, chemicals and corn). The
merchant marine is effective in its role of supporting the
balance of payments. However, a larger, more competitive
fleet would provide a welcome boost to today's declining trade
balance.
The fourth, and last, function of today's merchant mar-
ine is not so easily evaluated. The Department of Defense has
been both hesitant and ambivalent in its judgment as to the
effectiveness of the merchant marine in its role as a military
auxiliary.
For national defense considerations the U.S. merchant
marine consists principally of U.S. flag vessels, those flag
of convenience vessels considered by the Navy to be under ef-
fective U.S. control, and the government reserve fleet. In
1963 the numbers of ships in these categories were approxim-
ately as follows:
U.S. flag15 920




The question of the adequacy of this group of aging ships
to meet national defense needs has been argued for years. Its
- 15 -

answer depends to a great extent upon current thinking and
strategy within the Department of Defense. Throughout the
decade of the 1960»s the concept of forward positioning has
tended to mask the need for updating the merchant marine. In
his 1962 Annual Report the Secretary of Defense had this to
say:
cur combined military and civil sealift capability
continued to be generally adequate during fiscal year
1962, and current plans provide for no major changes in
the composition of our transport fleet. 1°
And, in the 1963 Annual Report:
The possibility of further reductions in lift
requirements is being tested by the prepositioning of
equipment in "floating depots" stationed in forward
areas.
"
In general the thinking has been that MSTS would provide a
nucleus fleet, directly controlled by the military, that
would provide those missions and capabilities not found in
the commercial merchant marine. 20,21 Thus, the forward de-
pots, when combined with an increased airlift capability and
a specialized MSTS fleet, would tend to negate the require-
ment for a massive modernization of the merchant fleet.
Except for specific weaknesses brought out by the Viet-
nam War build-up22 (lack of an adequate roll-on/roll-off cap-
ability, lack of shallow draft tankers, lack of refrigerator
ships, lack of cargo ships with a heavy lift capability) the
thought that the merchant marine was generally adequate has
remained dominant right up to the present time.
The weaknesses highlighted by the Vietnam operations,
- 16 -

when coupled with the refusal of Congress to fund any substan-
tial numbers of the fast deployment logistic ships, surest
that today's merchant marine is not adequate to satisfy strict-
ly military needs, to say nothing of being able to simultan-
eously maintain the commercial trade of the country.
In concluding this section, then, it is clear that the
U.S. merchant marine performs inadequately in three of its
four major roles. In the fourth role, balance of payments,
improved performance would be welcome. There is a definite
need for modernizing and increasing the capacity of the fleet.
1-1-2 Characteristics of the Liner i'arket
United States oceanborne trade falls into three general
areas: liner, irregular and tanker services. The liner ser-
vices are characterized by their scheduled, common carrier op-
erations. Liner ships operate on fixed routes and on a stable
schedule, seeking their business from the general public. Al-
though the dollar value of annual liner cargo represents about
80 o of the value of total annual U.S. oceanborne trade, the
tonnage of liner cargoes has grown very slowly over the past
decade, increasing from about thirty-nine million tons in 1954
to about 47.2 million tons in 1963. U.S. flag liners have
generally carried 20-30% of this tonnage. About two-thirds
of the U.S. flag tonnage is carried by ships receiving an op-
erating-differential subsidy from the federal government*^
Some of the more important characteristics of the liner
- 17 -

markets are outlined below,
(1) Liner cargoes are predominantly high valued goods.
In 1963 the 47.2 million tons of liner cargo consisted of
36.2 million tons of general cargo (higher value) and 11.0
million tons of bulk commodities (lower value). By compari-
son, the irregular shipping services (tankers not included)
carried 12.0 million tons of general cargo and 127.5 million
25tons of bulk commodities. J This division of cargo resulted
(in 1966) in an average cargo value of 655 dollars per ton
for the U.S. flag liners and of forty-four dollars per ton for
26the irregular services. The ability of the liners to attract
high valued cargo is significant in view of the fact (mention-
ed below) that the rate-setting conferences tend to set rates
that are proportional to the value of the cargo*
(2) Liner cargoes are generally carried by conference
vessels under conference rates. The rate-setting conferences
are regional organizations of shipping firms and operate to
promote the members* interests. They are of prime benefit to
the shipping firms and perform functions that are denied by
the anti-trust statutes to most other U.S. firms and indust-
ries.
Directly or indirectly, conferences perform
at least four major functions: (1) price-setting; (2)
allocating output among the members; (3) dividing rev-
enues; and (4) controlling entry. 2 7
As a result of the performance of the conferences, freight
rates tend to be higher than marginal costs would indicate
- IS -

and are certainly higher than they would be without conference
protection. A further conference benefit to the liner firms
is the practice of the conference in setting higher rates per
measurement ton (one MT equals 2240 lbs or 40 cu. ft,, which-
ever dominates) on higher valued cargoes, P'or example, the
following rates were applicable on the Hampton Roads, Virginia
to Hamburg, Germany route in 1962:
"




Paintings and antiques 176,50
Clearly the ship that is able to attract and handle large
volumes of higher valued cargoes will have a much higher rev-
enue potential than will a ship carrying lower valued cargoes,
(3) Liner ships operate for the most part on steady,
advertised schedules. While these schedules are required by
the Maritime Subsidy Board in the case of U.S. subsidized ship-
ping, they are also necessary in order to attract cargo from
the general public and in order to maintain steady industrial
customers,
(4) The liner industry today is marked by increasing
specialization and a "transport systems" orientation concerned
with the total transportation system from shipper to consignee.
This orientation is a direct result of the three preceding
it<ms. Any field marked by high revenue potential, monopoly
pricing and a steady schedule of operations is ideally situ-
ated to attract large amounts of capital. Since future mar-
- 19 -

kets are more easily predicted than in, say, a highly competi-
tive industry, less risk exists for the investor. Much effort
can be put into analysis, engineering design, and management
planning functions as well as into equipment. The result of
the ability to finance and undertake these Ion,'; range planning
activities is that the liner industry is becoming more capital
intensive and more concerned with the productivity and revenue
producing potential of the ship-port combination.
Clearly a long term goal of carrying a substantial portion
of U.S. trade under U.S. flag requires improvement in all areas
of shipping, not just the liner services discussed here. How-
ever this paper concentrates on the liner service. That ser-
vice, with its emphasis on productivity of the ship, demands
that a high degree of design, engineering and management tech-
nology be combined with large amounts of capital. U.S. indus-
try as a whole is very good at bringing both high levels of
technology and large amounts of capital to bear on specific
problems. 30
There are, potentially, at least two modes of operation
in which a variable mission ship can serve to attract capital
to the U.S. flag liner industry and to aid in increasing the
capacity of the fleet. The first mode is commercial/commer-
cial in nature; the second commercial/military in nature.
The two modes are discussed in the following sections.
1-1-3 Commercial/Commercial Variable Mission Ship
A v iriable mission ship offers to its owner two or more
- 20 -

highly specialized missions, together with a capability for
converting between them. To emphasize the significance of
this capability it is necessary to understand the implications
of specialization for liner shipping.
The profitability of a highly specialized ship is a
strong function of its ability to generate revenues. The
ship represents a large capital investment and any idle time
spent in port is extremely expensive. Also expensive is any
underutilization of the ship T s annual ton-mile capacity.
A specialized ship operating in a specialized market
would be expected to generate higher revenues and profits
than a more general purpose ship operating in that same mar-
ket. V/hen demand in the market falls, though, the specialized
ship is at a disadvantage. While the general purpose ship
shifts easily to more diverse cargoes, the specialized ship
makes this transition slowly and expensively, if at all. This
is, potentially, a very costly disadvantage of specialization.
Consider, for example, the cases of the container ship and the
barge carrying ship. As long as container and barge cargoes
are plentiful the ships perform efficiently and can generate
higher revenues than a general purpose cargo ship. But suppose
that there was an excess of container or barge shipping capac-
ity and the utilization rates of the specialized ships fell.
These ships would then be forced into direct competition for
more general cargo. An estimate of how they would fare in this




voyage technique. This study took actual shiploads of cargo
as carried on six voyages in 1965-66 by a general purpose,
WW II cargo ship. It then placed a container ship and a barge
carrier on the same routes with the same cargoes and analyzed
the results. Some of these results are summarized here,
(1) A port combination is defined as occurring when
cargo is available at a port visited and is destined for
another port on the ship f s schedule. Due to an inability
to make up unit loads, the barge carrier had to reject the
available cargo at 42,5$ of the port combinations. The fig-
ure for the container ship was 23. 9$
•
(2) Lost tonnage is defined as cargo tonnage available
which is rejected because it cannot be unitized or because
it is available in such a small amount that it would not be
economical to carry it. Lost tonnage, as a percentage of
tonnage actually carried, was four percent for the barge car-
rier and fifteen percent for the container ship.
(3) Cubic utilization of the two ships, the number of
cargo units (containers or barges) carried as a percentage
of the maximum number of units that could be carried, was
about thirty-five percent for the barge carrier and twenty
percent for the container ship.
These results point out Che dilemma of the owner of the
specialized ship. His ship f s efficiency offers a high revenue
potential but leaves him at the whim of the specialized market
for realization of this revenue. This paper proposes the var-
- 22 -

iable mission ship as one answer to the dilemma. The conver-
sion capability of a ship of this type provides the operator
with an added option in his efforts to .keep his ship profit-
ably employed. He can not only move his ship from port to
port or from trade route to trade route, but he can also shift
from one specialized service to another. In this sense his
profits are now less vulnerable to fluctuations in any one
particular market. The idea of shifting the ship from one
commercial market to another is discussed further in section
11-4.
1-1-4 Commercial/Military Variable Mission Ship
The commercial/military version of the variable mission
concept can serve to attract additional federal funds to the
existing construction subsidy program. Under this program
there would be, today, ample private funds for ship construc-
tion provided matching federal subsidy funds were also avail-
able. The rate of construction is constrained by the limited
availability of federal funds. That this is so can be seen
from the fact that at the end of fiscal year 196? the Maritime
Administration had requests pending for construction subsidy
on seventy-two new and converted ships. In contrast, only
twenty-four or twenty-five ships were expected to be author-
ized during a combined 1967-63 program. -*
In section 1-1-1 it was pointed out that today f s U.S.
flag fleet does not adequately fulfill its national defense
responsibilities. Accordingly, a variable mission ship, one
- 23 -

of whose specialized missions satisfied a demonstrated military
need, would provide added incentive for federal funding of
liner construction. It is this commercial/military aspect of
the variable mission ship that is emphasized in the remainder
of this paper.
Section 1-2 below shows that the national defense can be
well served by a ship able, in times of national emergency, to




1-2-1 Functions and Performance of the United States Navy
The basic purposes of the U.S. Navy are described in
the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy.-
UniteH%ioL!U?POr Jnd defend the Constitution of theited States against all enemies, foreign and domestic,
it. Jl a r°. insure ^he security of the United States,s possessions, and areas vital to its interests bytimely and effective military action. 7
3. To uphold and advance the national policiesand interests of ^.he United States.
a**-^
m ?° Pr? /ide assistance in civil defense as anadditional task and, as feasible at the time, with for-ces not required for essential military operations.33
From these broad purposes derive specific missions and func-
tions of the naval forces.
1. To organize, equip, and provide naval forces
for the conduct of amphibious operations
2. To organize, train, and equip naval forces
•for
..... antisubmarine warfare ;
etc. 34
In the ideal, unconstrained situation the approach used
in performing these functions would follow the philosophy
stated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1964.
When I assumed office, President Kennedy gave me twoprimary instructions which President Johnson has reaf-firmed: *irst, to develop the military structure requir-




G and °perate this force at the lowest
Time and experience have shown that this unconstrained prob-
- 25 -

lera does not exist; that, in reality, the U.S. Navy must oper-
ate under budget constraints. There are two major reasons for
the existence of these constraints. First, national security
and well-being are affected by internal is well as external
threats and problems. Thus non-military programs compete with
military programs for available funds. Second, even if there
were no non-military competition, it is surely true that antic-
ipated military problems and their projected solutions would
:row so as to use all available funds, resulting in the bud-
get constrained situation.
Cxiven the existence of budget constraints, then, it is
true a priori that every Navy function, no matter how general
or how detailed, must fall into one of the following categor-
ies :
Category I - Those functions that can be considered as
being accomplished. That is, sufficient
trained men and modern equipment are avail-
able to perform the function to the maximum
extent possible within the current state of
the art.
Category II - Those functions that can be considered as
being either partially accomplished or, for
all practical purposes, totally unaccomplished,
Further, due to the existence of the budget constraint, there
must be some functions in Category II,
The antisubmarine warfare field provides examples. Within
- 26 -

this field there are at least three basic functions;^"
1. Protect the U.S. Navy fleet
2. Protect the U.S. merchant shipping fleet
3. Protect the continental U.S. from attack by submar-
ine-launched ballistic missiles.
The first function fits into Category I, as being essential-
ly accomplished within the state of the art. The next two
fall into Category II. The Navy simply does not have suffic-
ient numbers of vessels to guarantee full performance in these
areas.
Within budget constraints Navy and Department of Defense
managers must rank their requested functions on a priority
basis and spend their money accordingly. New and exotic weap-
ons systems will thus tend to draw more attention and funds
than will the more traditional and mundane systems (compare
the Polaris missile forces with the mine-sweeping forces, for
example). Within its budget constraints the Navy attempts to
maintain as many modern ships as is possible, relying upon the
Selected Reserve, iiSTS and the merchant marine as back-up for-
ces in time of emergency.
When the constraints are severe as they have been in re-
cent years, some of the first areas to give up their claim on
funds are routine modernization, repair, and replacement of
general purpose, active duty ships. "The Department of Defense
has for some years been pushing the fleet modernization prob-
lem into the future. n^' Thus discussion centers today on an
- 27 -

active naval fleot, about sixty percent of which is more than
twenty years old and cannot be modified to handle new weapons
systems and equipment. ^°
In performing its required functions the Kavy has relied
principally upon the active fleet and the Selected Reserve^
for military missions. The warships in the inactive reserve
fleet are largely an ineffective force today due to their a*e,
to the time delay inherent in activating and manning them, and
to their small number. Supply and transport missions are to
be covered principally by iS'HS and the merchant marine.
TJ?he I'jverninent's policy is to depend on the [national
defense] reserve fleet and the merchant marine for emer-
gency expansion and to maintain in the mSTS fleet the types
of ship particularly suited to meet specific military needs
such as shallow-waLer tankers, wide-hatch and extra n
heavy-boom cargo ships, and forward mobile depot ships.
In meeting emergencies, then, the Navy must rely essent-
ially upon active duty ships for the effective performance of
its f notions. This paper seeks go focus attention on the
category II naval functions. Since it is clear that the Navy
cannot afford to maintain modern, active duty snips in suffic-
ient numbers to perforin all its missions, this paper suggests
that a search be made through the Category II functions to
seek out tiiose that can be performed witnout the use of an
active duty snip. Active duty ships are expensive to man and
operate; and, if their function is technically specialized,
they are expensive to modernize and maintain. In today's com-
plex world a great many ships become technologically obsolete
long before they wear out from a physical standpoint. If it
- 23 -

were possible to accomplish some functions without having to
maintain an active duty ship then it would be possible to
transfer these functions from Category II to Category I at
little cost. Overall effectiveness of the naval forces would
then be increased. The following paragraphs will show that
functions of this nature do exist.
1-2-2 Some Recent International Emergencies
Past deployments of naval forces suggest that not only
do wartime-only missions exist, but that there also exist sub-
stantial time periods during which required ships may be mobil-
ized. These time periods could be used to convert a variable
mission ship from its commercial mode to its military mode.
Two fairly recent deployments are discussed below
Korea - 195cA2
Jan-Mar 1950 U.S. Far East Comiaand received intelligence
reports that a North Korean attack was expected in
spring or early summer.
April-May 1950 North Korean military build-up widely noticed.
Hhee government in South Korea became alarmed.
May-June 1950 United Nations Commission established a system
of border observers.
25 June 1950 North Korean army attacked across the 3#th par-
allel.
27 June 1950 President Truman ordered General MacArthur to
use his air and naval forces against the invading army
- 29 -

and to use the 7th Fleet to neutralize Formosa.
i
30 June 1950 President committed U.S. ground troops to action.
8 July 1950 Chief of Naval (. perations ordered reactivation of
selected mothball fleet units.
15 September 1950 Amphibious landings at Inchon.
The rapid build-up from late June onward placed a heavy-
load upon Navy logistics efforts and brought into sharp focus
the failure of the military forces as a whole to plan for a
limited war-. To lift ammunition to the Far East, Commander
Service Forces Pacific had a single ammunition ship. In order
to accomodate the build-up it was necessary to put special lin-
ings in the holds of several attack cargo ships and make them
do the job.
The enemy was essentially unable to wage a war at sea.
Thus mine warfare was the only major naval threat that actu-
ally materialized. With many of the Navy T s minesweepers de-
activated (at outbreak of war only seven active duty minesweep-
ers were in Far Bast areas) a crash reactivation program was
required. In spite of all efforts during the war, stringent
economies before the war had so depleted the mine forces that
they remained a major naval deficiency throughout the emerg-
ency.
Other naval shortages involved hospital ships and fleet
stores issue ships (the only ones in the Pacific Fleet had
been deactivated) ; communications congestion due to limited
facilities and rapidly growing quantities of high precedence
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traffic; gasoline tankers to support aircraft and vehicles;
and reefer ships.
In general, the Navy r s mobilization was a good example of
making do with what was available until the desired ships could
be reactivated. Fortunately relatively modern mothball and re-
serve fleets existed from which the necessary ships could be
drawn,
Suez - 1956/f3
April 1956 Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen formed a
joint command directed against Israel,
April-June 1956 President Nassar fired Arab nationalism and
concluded extensive armaments agreements witht the Soviet
Union,
19 July 1956 U.S. decided not to help finance the Aswan Dam,
World Bank and Britain withdrew their offers of financial
aid on the dam,
26 July 1956 President Nassar nationalized the Suez canal.
30 October-b November Anglo-French offensive and landings
against Port Said and Port Fuad,
On 26 July Britain and France did not have the forces
necessary for an effective and successful intervention in the
canal zone. They formed a joint command in p.arly August and
mobilized some twenty tiiousand British reservists. Landing
craft, liners for troop transports, and tankers for water car-
riers were requisitioned from private firms. It wasn T t until
the end of October that the joint forces were strong enough
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to carry out the landings in the canal zone.
In addition to mobilization problems, the joint forces
had serious communications difficulties throughout the oper-
ation. British communications were centered in an ll,uoO ton
depot ship and those of the French on a 3,000 ton depot ship.
Both proved insufficient for the purposed of keeping close
control over tiie landing forces.
There are two significant lessons to be learned from
these conflicts. The first, and most obvious, is that mil-
itary actions require many ships and missions that are simply
not needed in times of peace. Such ships as minesweepers,
gasoline tankers, communications and command ships, and hosp-
ital ships are not needed in large numbers except during wars
or other conflicts. These are wartime-only missions, as op-
posed to more basic and continuing missions such as ASW pro-
tection of the active naval fleet. The personnel required for
their accomplishment can be obtained from reserve training pro-
grams. At the present time the ships required must come from
other active duty assignments or from the reserve fleet.
The second and far more important lesson of Korea and
Suez is that crises in the modern world tend to be preceded
by periods of civil violence, military build-up, and political
unrest.
Thus definite warnings of trouble appear prior to the con-
flict. Korea and Suez were not unique in this respect. Virt-
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ually every military crisis over the last two decades has dev-
eloped in the same manner,
Lebanon - 1957-53^
May 1953 Armed riots by opposition to President Chamoun.
Strikes, barricades in the opposition dominated cities
of Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli.
mid-May 1953 U.S. announces step-up in arms shipments to
Lebanese government. Sxtra battalion landing team sent
to Mediterranean.
14 July 195& President Chamoun requested U.S. intervention.
15 July 195^ U.S. troops landed near Beirut.
Cuba - 196245
29 August 1962 U-2 flight showed clear evidence of construc-
tion of surface-to-air missile sites.
Aug-Sept 1962 President Kennedy increased the frequency of
U-2 observation flights.
Sept-Act 1962 Military build-up in Cuba continued rapidly
but it was defense oriented.
14 October 1962 U-2 flight shows launch pads and buildings
for ballistic missiles.
22-24 October 1962 Quarantine established at sea by U.S. Navy
ships.
Dominican iiepublic - 1965




27 April 1965 President Johnson ordered U.S. troops landed
to protect U.S. citizens,
<?& <\pril .1-905 First Marines landed,
30 April 1965 Army and Air Force tactical units landed
It is clear that the decision as to when conditions are
serious enough to require military intervention is a subjec-
tive thing. The Dominican Republic, for example, underwent
several years of unrest prior to the revolt on 24 April 1965
which led to U.S. military action. Nevertheless the develop-
ment of these crises suggests that a warning period during
which military conflict becomes probable does exist in most
cases.
The observations of the existence of warning periods and
wartime-only military missions suggest that it would be advan-
tageous to have available reserve ships which could be activ-
ated in short periods of time. In the past the mothball and
national defense reserve fleets have provided these ships. In
the future they will not. It seems reasonable to suggest that
the planning of future naval force levels include an analysis
to identify wartime-only missions and that, where possible,
these missions be accomplished by commercial/military variable
mission ships. A variable mission ship would offer several ad-
vantages.
(1) The military payload package for complex missions
could be kept technologically up-to-date at much less cost
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than could an inactive reserve ship,
(2) The ship would be kept in operating condition and
in good repair by the owner as he used it in the commercial
market.
(3) In some cases (command and communications, for ex-
ample) the payload package could be used for shore training
purposes for reserve unit operators.
(4) The Department of Defense could buy one ship in
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It has been remarked as an imperfection
in the art of ship-building that it can never
be known, till she is tried, whether a new
ship will or will not be a good sailer; for
that the model of a good-sailing ship has been
exactly followed in a new one which has proved,
on the contrary, remarkably dull.,,,
,,, Besides, it scarce ever happens that a
ship is formed, fitted for the sea, and sail-
ed by the same person, one man builds the hull,
another rigs her, a third lades and sails her.
No one of these has the advantage of knowing
all the ideas and experience of the others, and,
therefore, cannot draw just conclusions from a






II-l CHOICE OF MISSIONS AND SHIP
H-1-1 Commercial Mission
The choice of a liner service mission for a specialized
ship is relatively easy to make today. The appearance and
subsequent success of containers in domestic shipping in 1956
ensured that it would be only a matter of time until they
were introduced on the international routes. The established
conference lines hoped to make a gradual transition to con-
tainers and, for a while, even placed penalty charges on con-
tainer shipments. All hopes were dashed in April, 1966 when
non-conference, non-subsidized Sea-Land Service, Inc., opened
a weekly all-container schedule on the North Atlantic routes.
-
1-
The rush by shipping firms to develop container capacity con-
tinues today.
A look at projected trade figures suggests that the fran-
tic development of container shipping capacity will prove to
be a good investment. In section 1-1-1 it was estimated that
annual U.S. foreign trade tonnage will triple in quantity by
the year 2000. World tonnage is expected to more than quad-
ruple in that time and about 15;£ of these tonnages are expect-
ed to consist of cargo that can be carried in containers. In
U.S. trade alone an increase in containerizable cargo from
about 30 million tons annually in 1963 to about 90 million
tons annually in 1990-2000 is a good possibility.
- 41 - I

The existence or this growing container market was con-
sidered together with the fact that containers lend themselves
to standardization of ships, port facilities, and inland trans-
port modes. The result was a decision to use the container
ship mission as one role of the variable mission ship analyzed
in this paper.
II-1-2 Military Mission
A roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) capability was chosen as a
second mission for the example ship. There were two princi-
pal reasons for this choice. First, a military need for Ro-
Ro capability is well documented. Although section 1-2 sug-
gested the need for such other missions as command and commun-
ications, mine sweeping, and antisubmarine warfare, the need
for these missions is highly subjective and is not well docu-
mented, Further, the technical characteristics of these mis-
sions are frequently treated as classified information. In
contrast, the military need for Ro-Ro capability was pointed
out vividly by J. A. Field-^ and has been repeatedly emphasized
in Department of Defense Annual Reports over the past ten
years. The technical characteristics of the Ro-Ro mission
are not classified.
A second reason for the choice xvas that a "military"
Ro-Ro mission is, in fact, an added employment option of the
commercial operator. If container ship utilization is low
he might shift to commercial Ro-Ro operation or even charter
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his ship to MSTS. These possibilities are discussed briefly
in section II-4-4.
II-1-3 Ship Choice
A specialized ship operating in a specialized market suc-
ceeds or fails according to its ability to generate revenues.
Revenues are proportional to the ten-mile per day capacity of
the ship. This capacity is dependent upon speed and port turn-
around time, both of which are crucial considerations. An ap-
preciation of the interplay of these two features may be p-ain-
ed by considering an example. On a 7200 mile round trip a
20,000 ton deadweight ship with a 25 knot speed and 7-|- day
turnaround time has a capacity of 5.33 million ton-miles per
day. A 12-|- knot ship of the same deadweight on the same
route, but designed for a 1-|- day turnaround time, has an
equal capacity and would generate the same revenues. Because
of its lower initial and operating costs the 12^- knot ship
would be much more profitable. With a turnaround time reduced
to 1-| days, the 25 knot ship has a capacity of 9.61 million
ton-mile 3 per day, 80$ greater than that of the 12^- knot
ship, and can thus justify its higher cost.
The importance of turnaround time led to the decision to
analyze a catamaran container ship. A single hull container
ship tied up at a wharf can be serviced by two or three gantry
cranes simultaneously. The catamaran, on the other hand, if
moored between finger piers, offers the possibility of simul-
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taneous service by four to seven cranes and promises great
reductions in turnaround time.
The Ro-Ro mission is also well served by the catamaran.
Single hull Ro-Ro ships tend to be volume limited due to low
utilization of bale cubic and are estimated to require about
double the cubic volume of a container ship to carry the same
weight of cargo. A catamaran, on the other hand, offers up
to 50% more usable volume and deck area than does a single
hull ship of equal total displacement and promises to carry
more Ro-Ro tonnage Further, its improved stability renders
it less sensitive to load distribution, allowing heavy mili-
tary vehicles to be stowed with relative ease.
As regards turnaround time, the catamaran offers the Ro-
Ro mission the same advantages it offers the container ship
mission. Where a single hull vessel has two, three or four
loading ramps, a catamaran ma;/ have four to ten, thus decreas*





The initial intent in design was to build an analytical-
empirical model of the ship design process. This model was to
be sufficiently accurate to allow the development of an econ-
omically optimal container ship. Unfortunately, information
available on large catamarans is not sufficient today to al-
low this type of model building. Perhaps the best study to
date (at least in terms of analyzing large numbers of ships)
was done by General Dynamics Corp. for the Maritime Administ-
5
ration. This study was only recently completed and was not
available in time to be used in this thesis.
Two principal ireas of weakness stood out in the search
for design information. The first area is resistance and pow-
ering. The ef.'ects of hull form and of the separation dis-
tance- between the hulls on total resistance are only incomp-
letely understood and the few theories that do exist have nev-
er been subjected to full-scale test. The best summary to date
appears in a paper- by Turner and Taplin; but even this repres-
ents m ad noc and not a systematic approach to the question.
The second area of weakness is in the estimate of steel
structure weights, particularly in the cross-structure between
the two hulls. The cross-structure design has been done for
some smaller ships? under 300 feet in length, but no work on
larger ships sterns to have been undertaken.
In view of these two weaknesses it was necessary to dis-
- 45 -

card the idea of trying to develop an optimal ship. Rather,
the approach of designing a sufficient ship was undertaken.
This approach proceeded as follows:
1. The 700 ft symmetrical design of Turner and
Taplin was chosen as the ship to be analyzed.
2. The cross-structure for this ship was analyzed
for weight estimates by following a procedure
parallel to that of Lankford.
3. The ship was then analyzed in terms of its
costs and revenue generating capabilities.
Table II and Figures 1 and 2 summarize the characteristics
of the ship. Section II-2-2 discusses some aspects of the de-
sign and section II-3 presents a detailed description of the
conversion of the ship from the container mission to the Ro-
Ro mission.
II-2-2 Design Assumptions
The example ship was assumed to operate as a container
ship on the North Atlantic trade routes at a service speed of
25 kts. A required endurance of £&50 miles at 25 kts is suf-
ficient for a round trip from Boston to Hamburg and back, a
500 mile coastal journey at each end of the trip, and two
day's reserve. The service spe^d of 25 kts is assumed to re-
quire SO/* of installed shaft horsepower. The design is a
basic, functional, uncomplicated ship whose only novel fea-
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ity. Conventional weight summaries are riven in Table III.
In order to qualify for federal construction subsidies
a design proposal must meet certain requirements in regard
to national defense features. The Navy prefers that cargo
ships have sustained speeds in excess of 20 kts ; that con-
tainer ships carry their own cranes, except where doing so
would place them at a competitive disadvantage; and that the
feasibility of installing T tween decks in container ships be
considered." The service speed of 25 kts in this design
clearly meets the speed requirement. Since the catamaran con-
tainer ship considered here is intended to operate between
modern container terminals it has not been provided its own
cranes. The alternate Ro-Ro mission is felt to be sufficient
to ensure Navy certification of the value of the ship in
time of national emergency*
Powering requirements were estimated from the data of
Turner and Taplin. The installed 112,000 SHP reflects a 3^
appendage allowance, a 75/& propulsive coefficient and a 25/o
service margin. The propulsion plant consists of a pair of
modern, oil-fired steam, reheat power plants, one in each
hull. Remote control is effected from a central control sta-
tion in the bridge superstructure forward. HJach engineroora
is equipped with a local operator* s console for instrumenta-
tion, alarm and local control purposes.
Propulsion machinery weights were estimated from Johnson
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sorvatively heavy. Endurance fuel weight of 7100 tons was
estimated using the procedure of Hauschildt12 and allowing
a service factor of 22/o on the design fuel rate of 0.4 lb/
SHP-hr.
Steel weight estimates proved to be a difficult problem
for this ship. ] uch work has. been done to correlate data for
single hull ships, but little exists on catamarans. The ap-
proach used was as follows:
1. Estimate steel weights of the two hulls inde-
pendently of the cross-structure.
2. Estimate loads, required section modulus and
weight of the cross-structure.
The hull steel weights were estimated from Benford •** \
Handel-^, 1° and Johnson and Rumble. The three figures were
within 20/a of each other and the heaviest (13,030 tons, Ben-
ford) was chosen as a conservative estimate of the weight of
the two hulls.
A gross weight estimate for the cross-structure was ob-
tained by following the design procedure of Lankford. Since
sea response data was not available for a large catamaran,
the response operator for Lankford T s 251 ft catamaran was
17
nondimensionalized as suggested by £.V. Lewis. ' From this
point Lankford^ procedure for estimating sea loads was fol-
lowed step-by-step, assuming the ship would experience one
year continuous duty in the North Atlantic. The resulting
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weight estimate was about 3.7 tons per foot of cross-structure,
giving a total cross-structure weight of about 2070 tons.
Acquisition costs were estimated using procedures of Ben-
ford and Johnson and Rumble. The figure due to Johnson and
Rumble was the higher (.,340.7 million) but was by far the more
realistic. Further, it is a conservative influence in the
economic comparisons made in section II-4
•
II-2-3 Capabilities
The proposer! catamaran is an expensive ship. It offers
the possibility oX1 high revenues to its commercial operator
and a much needed Ro-Ro capability to the military. Table IV
summarizes the ship capabilities in each of the two missions.
When in the container mode the ship may be weight or
volume limited. The weight limited case is illustrated by
assuming the gross weight of each container to be thirty long
tons, the maximum recommended by the International Standards
Organization, flven though the ship has the cubic capacity to
carry 1065 containers, 742 in holds and 343 on deck, with a
container weight of thirty tons the ship can carry only 566
containers due to its maximum available payload weight (see
Table III), At a weight of 15.94 tons per container the ship
could carry its full load of lu65 containers. For lesser con-
tainer weights the ship becomes volume limited. To make an
estimate o£ the condition of the ship under an "average full
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side of the container is assumed. *° v/ith a usable volume
equal to 88-fi of that enclosed by the outside dimensions of
20the containers , cargo weight per container is thus 20.1 tons
for a 40 Tx3 l x3 t container. An average, empty, 40 ft contain-
2
1
er weighs about 3.1 tons x to give a gross weight of 23.2
tons per container. In this "average full load" condition
the ship can carry 735 containers.
The container ship catamaran can be serviced by as many
as five pier-mounted gantry cranes. At an upper limit of
22twenty containers per hour per crane the ship can be load-
ed and unloaded of 1065 containers in about twenty-two hours.
In the Ro-Ro mode the ship may also be either weight or
volume limited. The Ford Falcon and medium tank figures
shown in Table IV illustrate the two cases. The ship can
be serviced by at least five loading ramps and can load and





The conversion packages or modules chosen for this ship
are simple steel frameworks that fit into the container cells.
They were chosen after consideration of three principal points:
1. High handling rates for containers mitigate
against sliding them around on the »tween decks
of a Ro-Ro ship,
2. The mission change package must represent a min-
imum capital investment, be durable and mainten-
ance free, and be easily handled as a package or
a module,
3» The mission change process must cause a minimum
of interference with routine ship services, sys-
tems and spaces.
Consideration of the first point resulted in a decision
to design the catamaran as a true container ship with as many
container cells as could be accommodated. The mission change
package would then convert the ship from container to Ro-Ro
operation at some loss in cargo deadweight tonnage. The last
two points weighed heavily against such devices as cranes or
elevators and resulted in the simple, box-like structure des-
cribed below.
The complete conversion package consists of 34 modules,
$ ramp type and 26 deck type. The ramp type is depicted
















about 40 ft x 16.3 ft x 43.2 ft and replaces 12 containers
in a 6 high by 2 across cell section. Two such sections are
at the forward end of each hull and two more are at the after
end. Vehicle entry ports are permanently installed in the
hull at the second deck level. From the second deck the ramps
provide access to all four internal parking decks (including
the tank deck) and the topside main deck. The 8 ramp type
modules are estimated to weigh 4#0 tons and cost #160,000.
Sach of the 26 deck type modules is 36 ft in height and
contains three horizontal decks which match deck ledges inside
the ship so as to provide increased parking space. These led-
ges can be seen in figure 1. The deck type modules are in
three widths to conform to the different container cell group-
ings. The largest of these is estimated to weigh 90 tons.
The 26 deck type modules as a group are estimated to weigh
2230 tons and cost ^520,000.
No modules are installed in the cross-structure. Deck
clearance inside this structure will accept two stacked con-
tainers or vehicles up to about 16 feet in height. This clear-
ance allows the stowage of large vehicles. Decks in the two
hulls have clearance of about 12 feet and accept smaller ve-
hicles.
The modules have been described here as one-piece frame-
works. In shipyards where either crane lifting capacity or
available height clearances are inadequate to accommodate the
one-piece units the modules may be constructed in sub-units.
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iiiach sub-unit would then be fitted with standard A. 3. A. corner
-fittings and stacked in the cell like an ordinary container,
II-3-2 ilission Change
Total caoital investment in the catamaran mission change
package (including modules, spreader frames and loading ramps)
is estimated to be less than $1 million. Continuing costs of
the package are maintenance, storage rental, and opportunity
loss on the capital if the package is not used,
Conversion time from mission to mission is conservative-
ly estimated at 10 hours, With several cranes available it
could be as little as two hours. From a military reaction
time point of vie'/ the worst case situation would be a mobil-
ization when the ship was in Europe. Delay would be six days
travel time, ten hours conversion time, and travel time to the
required military loading site. Of those emergencies describ-
ed in Part I only the Dominican Republic incident had a warn-
ing time sufficiently short to preclude mobilization and de-
ployment of the catamaran as a ito-Ro ship. In that incident
there was only a four day delay between the initial armed coup
and the landing of the Marines,
Low cost and short conversion time are the major attrac-
tions of the catamaran mission change package. Still, two
other advantages bear mentioning,
(1) The catamaran does not have to go into a shipyard
for conversion. Virtually any port with a crane to lift con-
tainers could install the modules. Trom a military viewpoint
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this moans the nodules could be stored where their probability
of use was highest. For a commercial operator it means that
he could store them at his own facilities.
(2) If designed in container-sized sub-units the mod-
ules would be portable. They could be transported by air or
sea to any desired location or to a rendevous with the cata-





The catanaran described in sections IJ-2 and II-3 was de-
signed as a high speed, high capacity container ship. Its
acceptance is dependent upon its performance on the trade
routes. The following sections look at the ship from three
aspects. Section II-4-2 determines the minimum required
freight rate at which the ship can operate over the long term.
Section 31-4-3 compares the profitability of the catamaran,
the Lykes Sea Barge Clipper (C$-5-^2a) and the container ship
proposed by j levers. ^ Section II-4-4 discusses the hypothet-
ical case where the commercial operator would find it profit-
able to use the Ro-Ro mission of the ship.
Throughout this part of the paper the following condi-
tions are assumed.
1. 25 year, 7/* mortgages
2. Straight line depreciation
3» k&/o corporate tax rates
4» Ship is in its first year of operation
5. Salable cubic capacity is equal to &&/* of the
volume enclosed by the outer dimensions of the
containers.
Unless otherwise noted, all operating cost estimates are
made from Benford^ in order to ensure uniformity and are cor-
rected to present (1963) at 6/o per year.
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II-4-2 llinimum iequired Freight itate
The minimum required freight rate (XFU) is defined as
that rate in dollars per cubic foot that must be earned on
the total salable cubic capacity of the ship to just break
even. That is, at minimum RFIi the ship will earn sufficient
revenue to pay income taxes and principal on the mortgage.
Then the cash flow of the owner is exactly zero.
Cash
_
L Tax \ /Total Total ^ , n ...










)Revenue v ' ^Cubic /
Information pertinent to the minimum !{?R calculation is
summarized in Table V, All figures in Table V are based upon
a single round trip during the first year of operation of the




(1065 x 40 x 8 x S x 0. SB) (2 trips^
= 4*8 million cubic feet
The principal payment on the mortgage is not included in
the total expense figure. Setting cash flow equal to zero
and solving for total revenue gives a total revenue of
1
)S60
thousand. Then, from the second equation, minimum RFR is
..JO. 179 per cubic foot. Thus, if the owner could sell lOO/o
of his container volume on both legs of the round trip he
could charge as little as ,?0.1# per cubic foot(,p7.20 per IT)




Data for Mini mm Required Freight Rate Calculation
Variable Mission Catamaran - Container node
Acquisition cost
Round trip, Boston-Hamburg




12 days at sea
and 2 days in port
4.3 million ft5
or 120,000 1 IT














^Container handlin"- and other car^;o expenses






















Notes: (1) Container handling; and other cargo expenses
AW
are estimated as explained in Appendix A.
The figure includes container handling, main-
tenance, and replacement costs,
(2) All figures in this table are based upon a
single round trip during the first year of
operation of the ship.
- 64 -

A similar calculation, based upon the assumption that
the owner could soil or carry only 566 containers (the weight
limited case), shows that he would have to charge $0,249 per
cubic foot in order to maintain a zero cash flow.
These figures compare favorably with the prevailing
rates of >0.o0 to
;
0.o0 per cubic foot on the North Atlantic
routes.
II-4-3 Comparison
This section compares revenues, expenses and profitabil-
ity of the catamaran container ship, the Lykes Sea Barge Clip-
per and the container ship of Keyers.
The following assumptions have been made:
1. A freight rate of .;0.60 per cu! ic foot is
charged for container capacity of the Boston-
Hamburg route. A rate of $6.35 per long ton
is charged on liquid cargo carried by the
Lykes ship.
2. The catamaran and Beyers 1 ship have a 50;£ util-
ization rate of their salable cubic capacity.
The Lykes ship has a 50$ utilization of its con-
tainer capacity and a 50/£ utilization of its
liquid stowage capacity.
3. All ships are in their first year of operation.
Table VI summarizes the results for the three ships.
All figures are annual totals for the ship in question. Ap-




Comparison Figures for Three Specialized Ships
Catamaran Container Ship:
50/9 utilization of salable cubic
iA-0,7 million acquisition cost










25Lykes Sea Barge Clipper :
50/o utilization of salable cubic
50/o utilization of liquid stowage capacity
,;)32.0 million acquisition cost
24 round trips per year
Total revenue 30.35 million
Total expense 13*75 million
After tax profit (including
depreciation)
Capital recovery factor
IP*- QV,- 26iieyers 1 Container CDhip :
50,a utilization of salable cubic






17 round trips per year
Total revenue v;il3.# million
Total expense 7.7 million
After tax profit (including
depreciation) 4»0 million
Capital tecovery Factor 0.205
Note: (1) All figures are annual totals for the ship
during its first year of operation,
(2) A description of the method used to calculate
expenses appears in Appendix A.
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ship. Calculations for the catamaran were made in an anal-
agous fashion. Figures for the Meyers ship were taken from
his paper.
Both the Lykes and the Meyers ships were designed as
high capacity, high revenue ships. The variable mission
catamaran in its container ship mode compares favorably
with them,
II-4-4 Coiomercial/Commercial Use
Section 1-2-3 suggested the possibility of utilizing
the variable mission capability of the catamaran within the
commercial market to reduce the owner's vulnerability to
changes in market conditions or to allow the owner to take
advantage of out of phase fluctuations in the two markets
(Ro-'.io and container).
As a first case assume the collapse of container freight
rates. This assumption is not altogether .groundless. There
is considerable fear that the currently rapid expansion will
27lead to excess container capacity and falling rates. It
was shown above that the catamaran owner needs an average
rate of >0,13 per ft-* on his total available capacity in
order to cover his long run average costs, further, he needs
a rate of ,;0.12 per ft^ (v4.#0 per MT) just to cover the
marginal costs of making a round trip. If rates fell below
r;>4.80 per MT he could minimize losses by leaving the ship
tied up at the pier; by converting the ship to a Ro-Ro cap-
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ability(if he owned the modules); or, possibly, by char-
tering the ship to MSTS in its ;lo-i~to configuration,
A second, and far more interesting case, is the one in
which the ship operator schedules conversions of the catamaran
according to his predicted future market. For example, sup-
pose that demand for container services was either uncorrel-
ated with or was negatively correlated with demand for Ro-
Ro services. The fleet ship owner would see this condition
in his bookings and could, with good information, allocate
his ship to whichever service would provide maximum expected
profit (or minimum expected loss). As transport systems be-
come increasingly standardized and planning horizons grow,
the ship owner will come to use network scheduling programs
to allocate his ships. Such an optimal scheduling would take
into account mission change time, costs and expected revenues
over the available planning horizon. The owner would know
just when it was worthwhile to change and when it was not.
Essentially he would manage his capital investment in the
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In the introduction to those proposals
I stated their publication, not as an act
of mine, but of some T publicspirited gentle-
man, T avoiding is much as I could, according
to my usual rule, the presenting of myself







The first half of this paper demonstrated the validity
of the concept of a commercial/military variable mission shin.
Through the catamaran example the second half demonstrated the
economic and engineering feasibility of such a ship.
The earning power of the container ship catamaran was
shown to compare favorably with other specialized ships.
This point is important to the commercial operator. Even
more important is the low cost and short conversion time for
the mission change package. This point is important from the
aspect of national defense and provides a stronger incentive
for government aid to the liner construction program than do
conventional liners.
The conclusions of this paper are:
(1) that the variable mission concept should be consid-
ered during the design formulation stages of new ships for
both military and commercial purposes
j
(2) that new ships may, in some cases, be thought of
as basic, function l1 transport vehicles carrying different
complex mission packages;
(3) that, when used, the variable mission ship offers
the possibility of a large increase in effectiveness at rel-
atively low cost.
The economic feasibility of a specific example of a
commercial/commercial variable mission ship has only been
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suggested in this paper. Study of the economic feasibility
of commercial/commercial variable mission ships in general
is recommended as a future topic. A detailed study of ocean
freight patterns might s^rvc to identify individual markets
that could be exploited by a commercial/commercial variable
mission ship. Another possibility is the case where changes
in mission would be environmentally controlled due to season-





For purposes of profitability comparison the catama-
ran, the Lykes 3ea Barge Clipper, and the container ship
of Meyers were chosen. The expense figures for Meyers'
ship are given in his paper for a single round trip and
the same format was used in the estimates for the catama-
ran and the Lykes ship. The procedure used was to first
estimate revenues and expenses for a single round trip
and then to multiply by the expected number of trips per
year to get the annual totals for purposes of comparison.
All references to equation numbers in this Appendix
2
correspond to the numbers in Benford. The 1962 dollars
of Benford are corrected to present (196#) at 6fo per
year (factor of 1.42).




Maximum number of 20 T x# T x$ T
containers
Maximum liquid load capacity
















Round trip (RT) on Boston-Hamburg route:
Sea time at 20.5 kts 14 days
Turnaround time (2 ports) 1 day
Total round trip 15 days
Hound trips per year 24
Revenue per Hound Trip
Container freight rate assumed ,^0.60 per cubic foot
Liquid load freight rate
assumed ;?6.#5 per long ton
50/j utilization of containers and liquid load capacity
is assumed.
Container Revenue = (2) (1550) (20x3x3) (.3$) (.5) (0.60) =
)1.045 million per RT
Liquid Load Revenue = (2) (35,000) ( .5) (6.35) = $239,000
per RT
'/ages
A crew of 42 was assumed.
Sqn (26) : with 24 round trips per year, crew cost per
RT is ,;;32,000.
Subsistence
Penford estimated annual cost at 3770 per man in 1962.




:<Jqn (29): Cost per RT - $1465
Maintenance and Repair
Eqn (27): Hull - ,£#700 per RT
Sqn (2#) : Machinery - ;2740 per RT
Insurance
Eqn (3D : Protection and Indemnity - ;,)2400
Eqn (32): Hull and Machinery - #13,350
V/ar Risk - Benford estimated 0.1 percent of invested
cost in 1962.
Cost per RT - :>1S95
Total Insurance Cost - $13,145 per RT
Other Vessel Expense , Misc. ^peratinfc Expense
Benford estimated $65,000 + $Z x Cubic Number in
1962.
Cost per RT - $10,500
Fuel Oil
Benford estimated cost at ^2.15 per barrel in east-
ern U.S. in 1962.
Cost per RT - $41,300
Port Expenses
,
Eqn (33): Cost per call - $1890
Two ports of call - $3730
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ISqn (34) : Cost per day - ,,5632
One half day turnaround tine in each port
gives total cost of .}6&Z also.
Total Port Expense - $4462 per RT
Other Cargo Expenses, Container Operation
These two categories total :|43,950 per RT for the
Meyers ship but are otherwise unexplained. This figure
is equivalent to .$0,019 per cubic foot of the salable
cubic capacity of Meyers* ship. It is assumed that the
same cost of $0,019 per cubic foot applies to the Lykes
ship as well.
Cost per RT - #33,200
Liquid load expenses are unknown, but are felt to
be low compared to the figure for containers.
Administration and General, Advertising, Organization
The total figure is taken to be the same as that
of Meyers
Cost per RT - $26, #51
Vessel Depreciation
A 25 year, 7% mortgage is assumed. The 7% includes
mortgage insurance premiums. During the first year the
figures are:
Interest per RT - #93,300
Principal per RT - $21,400
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Cargo Handling and Freight Acquisition
i7or containers, Meyers' figure of „;0.10 per foot of
salable cubic capacity is assumed.
For liquid load $2.00 per long ton is assumed.
Container handling - £174,500 per RT
Liquid handling - $70,000 per RT
Summing the expenses (not including principal on
the mortgage) gives a total round trip expense of )572,373
or :>13.75 million per year.
Hound trip revenue was ^1.2^4 million or -y30.$5
million per year.
At a 4#$ tax rate, after tax profits with deprecia-
tion added in are ,)10.1# million which is the figure
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